7 February 2022 12:05 am Views - 1671
- There are severe efficiency gaps in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sectors
- The manifesto makes an immediate critique of the open economic policy of 1977
- Rapid Response manifesto does little to suggest that JVP/ NPP represents a vanguard intelligentsia of any creed
Future generations will judge this period in Sri Lanka’s history as one defined by extreme turmoil and upheaval; as a country, we have been here before: the 1953 Hartal, the ’58 Anti-Tamil Pogrom, the JVP
''There is little doubt that the JVP-led coalition has made inroads within the public consciousness, leading the charge with Unions and Peasantry organizations. AKD’s strength has always been his clear, precise and colourful articulation of the corruption and excesses of government''
As the nation reels from this largely policy driven disaster, the political wheels have begun to turn, with rumblings of discontent in the governing coalition. The Oppositional elements are gaining traction with Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s (AKD) JVP-led National People’s Power showing renewed energy and organization. In the mid ‘90’s, AKD was a Cabinet Minister for Agriculture, Land, Livestock and Irrigation and the JVP, of which he was a central figure, was crucial to the electoral successes of then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaranatunga (CBK). This convergence between the Marxist-Leninist JVP and CBK’s People’s Alliance was an interesting irony of history. When Sri Lanka’s previously pre-eminent Leftist organization, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) joined the Socialist SLFP in mid 1960s, the LSSP was expelled from the global organization, the Trotskyite Fourth International, which considered the SLFP to be bourgeois nationalists.
An Antidote to Chaos?
The AKD-led National People’s Power (Jathika Jana Balawegaya) recently released their manifesto, riding a wave of media hype that seeks to frame the JVP-led coalition as a serious contender for the oppositional throne. “Rapid Response to Overcome Current Challenges” is a 26-page booklet, much anticipated as an antidote to the chaos. However, what Rapid Response brings to the table are a set of well-meaning but largely banal bullet points with little of genuine substance. The brighter points are ironically, not ‘rapid’ responses but long-term investments, specifically into healthcare and education, calling for annual minimum expenditures of 5% and 6% of GDP respectively.
The manifesto makes an immediate critique of the open economic policy of 1977, specifically its “prioritization of personal gain over social responsibility”. The heading of this section reads “A Thriving economy instead of a Dependent Economy” which calls for “an export oriented approach with value-added products taking into account global trends and promote the production of goods and services that can generate more foreign exchange by joining the global supply chain”.
''The manifesto at least reiterates the longstanding JVP-AKD opposition to the Executive Presidency, calling for the cabinet to be accountable to Parliament instead of the President who as per the NPP should be elected by Parliament and not by the people''
There are a raft of contradictions here: On the one hand, a critique of the open economy, on the other a call to increase exports and join a global supply chain. Given the interdependent and interconnected nature of global economies, given the limited size, scope and production capabilities of Sri Lankan industry and Sri Lanka’s inherent dependence on exports, how does Sri Lanka become self-reliant? Further, if the open economy has been destructive, what form does the alternative take?
There are severe efficiency gaps in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sectors, compounded by stringent labour laws and regulations; just one reason why the world’s manufacturing conveyor belts are concentrated East-ward. The NPP should be clear in what they are trying to achieve. To join the global supply chain in any meaningful way would require the diluting of Sri Lanka’s rigorous labour protections, which will undoubtedly reduce costs, but this seems counter intuitive given the Socialist leanings of the NPP.
One senses here a whiff of import substitution, similar to ‘Vistas of Prosperity,’ as well as a misunderstanding of a key factor of production: cost. Sri Lankan businesses often prefer to import raw materials for the production process rather than source locally, mainly due to cost but also, quality and supply chain efficiency and reliability. Any plan to shift production locally must consider these key attributes of production; unfortunately, the NPP manifesto makes no such considerations. In its critique of Neo-Liberalism, the NPP seems to misunderstand that its own export oriented “value added” approach requires many facets of neo-liberalism including free trade; Sri Lanka’s exports are dependent on open markets. This is the fundamental challenge facing the JVP-led coalition; the need to balance its Marxist-Leninist roots while positioning Sri Lanka within the global marketplace.
''The NPP should be clear in what they are trying to achieve. To join the global supply chain in any meaningful way would require the diluting of Sri Lanka’s rigorous labour protections, which will undoubtedly reduce costs, but this seems counter intuitive given the Socialist leanings of the NPP''
Growing Pains
How Sri Lanka responds to this crisis will determine what kind of societal structures will survive. On the one hand, Sri Lanka’s liberal establishment will call for significant market-led reforms: cuts to welfare, social security and the introduction of austerity measures to ease budgetary pressure and build reserves for debt repayment. This path may necessarily require the free-float of the Rupee against the Dollar and the complete removal of consumption subsidies and price controls. A “pro-business” focus will likely lead to further deregulation and entrenchment of the corporate classes in Sri Lanka’s own political swamp. The results are likely to be positive in terms of GDP and other economic indicators as well as business/ consumer confidence indices. The brunt of the real impacts will be felt by the daily-wage worker, the farmer, the blue-collar worker, the entire working poor; unarguably the segment with the least representation in the hallways of power. The modern UNP have long been supporters of this policy catalogue, seen by the liberal-intelligentsia as akin to necessary evils or growing pains.
An alternative antidote would be to further entrench the state and bureaucracy in the administration of the economy, demonize private enterprise and regulate, top to bottom all manner of activity. In 2006, the Sri Lankan state employed some 900,000 people; today the Sri Lankan state employs approximately one and half million people. The question is, whether the increase in human resources has led to an improvement in services provided; the short answer is, No!
Media Tilt
Sri Lanka has shown that an over-correction is often no correction at all. The concentration of power by the Rajapaksa family within the SLFP and its resultant largesse led to the so-called “Yahapalanaya”. The Yahapalanaya’s infighting and inertia coupled with a laundry list of unpopular and ill-considered policies would drive the electorate back in to the waiting arms of another national saviour: an Ultra-Right Wing deviation of the Rajapaksa project. The premise of a Lee Kwan Yew administrative juggernaut with fresh ideas, powered by professionals promoted through a meritocracy, now seems almost delusional.
As the crises grow in both multitude and severity, there has been a media tilt towards alternatives, especially towards the NPP and AKD. There is little doubt that the JVP-led coalition has made inroads within the public consciousness, leading the charge with Unions and Peasantry organizations. AKD’s strength has always been his clear, precise and colourful articulation of the corruption and excesses of government.
Yet there seems to be an interesting dynamic developing on televised media. The major news organizations tend to provide air-time to both the government as well as oppositional forces and depending on the channel, the narrative or undertone will shift somewhat. The trick one must notice is that the NPP-JVP and even the UNP seem to receive attention that is disproportionate to its electoral base. It should seem counterintuitive that the SJB, with over 50 seats in Parliament, tends to receive only slightly more air-time than some other oppositional elements that barely have a handful of seats. AKD and the NPP needed to justify this media tilt by providing an alternative set of solutions; nuanced and substantive enough to show they offer a serious divergence. The JVP certainly have much to prove electorally, it has yet to match the fiery rhetoric and steadfast organization with anything approaching viability at the polls. The vacant sign and empty parking lot of the Sri Lankan centre-left needs urgent attention.
Minority rule by Globalist Proxy
Given its title, ‘Rapid Response’ should have provided a basic roadmap back that brings the Treasury back to solvency. The manifesto does not consider the opportunities and threats of an IMF programme, there is no critique of the SLPP tax cuts. As Sri Lanka now has some of this region’s lowest corporate tax rates, it represents an open goal for any political manifesto, one that the NPP seems to have missed completely.
The manifesto at least reiterates the longstanding JVP-AKD opposition to the Executive Presidency, calling for the cabinet to be accountable to Parliament instead of the President who as per the NPP should be elected by Parliament and not by the people. This is an interesting dynamic within Sri Lanka’s unique power structure; is the office of the Executive Presidency too powerful to retain or is it another necessary evil to bypass the gridlock of a parliament with a weak majority.
The Liberal segment of the Sri Lankan electorate voted in large numbers for Yahapalanaya and its promise of good governance which was to begin with the abolishing of the Executive Presidency. The Sri Lankan nationalist heartland believe this seat and its occupant to be a guarantor against minority rule through globalist proxy. The electorate went in the opposite direction with their votes for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in effect a rejection of the Parliamentary lethargy of the Yahapalanaya regime with its competing power centres and contradictory rhetoric.
''The JVP certainly have much to prove electorally, it has yet to match the fiery rhetoric and steadfast organization with anything approaching viability at the polls. The vacant sign and empty parking lot of the Sri Lankan centre-left needs urgent attention''
However, consecutive Yahapalanaya and Pohottuwa administrations have proved that Executive Presidency or not, the inertia, gridlock and debilitating political wrangling remains. Neither an Executive President nor a Cabinet answerable to Parliament has resulted in any substantial improvements to the material conditions of Sri Lankans. Oppositional parties might consider moving away from this abstract debate surrounding the power of the Executive vs Parliament and focus instead on policy.
This is where Rapid Response disappoints. There are any number of practical policy reversals that can be taken immediately to halt the free-fall of the economy. The NPP manifesto lurches in familiar, idealistic territory without revealing anything that might justify its possible emergence as a genuine electoral contender.
The substantial holes in the manifesto provides the SJB with ample opportunities to counter with its own vision. There are ideological battles to be waged within the SJB but that should be seen as a strength, not a weakness. The SJB possesses personalities that have survived the Yahapalanaya debacle unscathed: MPs Harin Fernando, Dr. Harsha De Silva, Eran Wickramaratne and Champika Ranawaka; each with their own niche. This provides a significant advantage to the opposition. Whereas the NPP, UNP and the SLPP seem to be revolving around cults of personality, the SJB has all the necessary foundations to form a cognizant and coherent policy platform. At its helm, the Premadasa brand is a vital asset and remains popular in rural Sri Lanka, a fact often under-appreciated by the liberal establishment.
Opportunistic Vanguardism
The ideological confusion is emblematic of the Marxist-Leninist Communist JVP. It may seem pedantic but is hugely informative of why there always seems to be so little convergence of leftist movements and why they are so prone to circular firing squads. Lenin himself is a much debated figure in history, especially among scholars of Socialism. Prof. Noam Chomsky has written extensively about Leninism and in particular its allegiances with Stalinism noting that for many ‘mainstream’ Marxists of that era, Lenin was a right wing deviation of the socialist movement. Two of the more famous Marxist intellectuals, Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek have referred to what they view as Lenin’s ‘opportunistic vanguardism’.
Similar to Lenin, the NPP and AKD are counting on the belief that they, the radical intelligentsia, would exploit popular movements to cease control of the state and then organize the populace in to the kind of society they so choose. The Rapid Response manifesto does little to suggest that the JVP/ NPP represents a vanguard intelligentsia of any creed; offering nothing of substance as an alternative in these most desperate of times.
The write can be reached on: kusumw@gmail.com and Twitter: @kusumw