The SOERU and the insulation it provides against bad privatisations

25 July 2024 12:06 am Views - 236

At the heart of the policy are nine strategic principles, the most important being the principle of state ownership justification


For decades, Sri Lanka’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been plagued by inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of transparency. Apart from the burden on the public purse, the consequences for citizens have included substandard medicines to exploding gas cylinders. Over the past twenty years vested interests have mushroomed around SOEs. 
 
The opposition to privatisation in Sri Lanka stems from a mixture of ideology and vested interests. On the ideological front, there’s a lingering sentiment, rooted in post-independence nationalism that views state ownership as a bulwark against foreign exploitation. This perspective sees SOEs not just as economic entities, but as symbols of national sovereignty and social welfare, regardless of how well these entities actually serve the purpose for which they were set up. However, much of the opposition stems from entrenched vested interests. Trade unions may have genuine concerns fearing job losses. Then there are the suppliers, many politically connected, who profit handsomely from contracts with SOEs. Privatisation threatens their lucrative arrangements. Most formidable are the politicians. SOEs are their patronage piggy banks, offering jobs to supporters, contracts to financiers, and opportunities of corruption. For these groups, opposing privatisation isn’t about protecting the public good; it’s about preserving their personal and political fiefdoms. 
 
These vested interests usually work behind the scenes instigating the clergy and other groups to oppose privatisation or reform. Understanding this interplay of misguided ideology and naked self-interest is crucial for anyone seeking to reform Sri Lanka’s economy. 
 
The Sri Lankan Cabinet’s approval of the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform Policy is an important moment in the country’s economic governance. This policy, crafted by the State-Owned Enterprise Restructuring Unit (SOERU), establishes a clear, principled framework for managing and reforming SOEs, addressing long-standing issues of inefficiency, corruption and the fiscal burden.
 
Redefining state owned businesses 
 
At the heart of the policy are nine strategic principles, the most important being the principle of state ownership justification. This criterion mandates state control for instances of market failure or where essential goods and services cannot be efficiently provided by the private sector. This ownership clarity focuses government resources on genuine public needs and curbs the practice of using SOEs as political playthings, reducing opportunities for patronage and corruption. Another pivotal principle is the redefinition of commercial SOEs as Public Commercial Businesses (PCBs). This isn’t mere semantics; it’s a fundamental shift in mind-set. PCBs are expected to operate on commercial principles, prioritising efficiency, profitability, and market competitiveness. This principle, combined with the mandate for PCBs to comply with corporate governance standards akin to listed companies, injects private sector discipline into public entities.
 
Holding company model and improved governance mechanisms
 
The establishment of a holding company for PCBs helps minimise political interference and the abuse of PCB resources for political ends. The holding company will set performance targets, monitor efficiency, and crucially, implement time-bound exit strategies. This ensures that state involvement in commercial sectors is temporary, a bridge to a fully competitive market. 
 
Governance reforms are equally robust. The policy stipulates stringent ‘fit and proper’ criteria for board appointments, ending the era of political appointees. An independent Advisory Council will oversee this process, of appointing directors to the holding company, further insulating it from political interference. 
 
For appointment of directors to PCBs under the holding company; each subsidiary PCB will establish a nominations committee in accordance with CSE rules. This committee will recommend director candidates to the subsidiary’s board, ensuring these candidates meet the ‘fit and proper’ test and the profile outlined in the PCB’s Articles of Association. If the subsidiary board approves a candidate, the recommendation will be sent to the holding company for final approval. Both subsidiary board and holding company board must approve candidate for the appointment to proceed. If either board disapproves, the nominations committee must propose a new candidate. This process minimises political interference. 
 
New standards of disclosure 
 
Transparency and accountability are also hardwired into the policy. PCBs will be required to make comprehensive, standardised disclosures, mirroring Colombo Stock Exchange and Securities and Exchange Commission standards. This includes a board committee oversight, audit, related party transactions and remuneration committees. The disclosure rules will increase transparency.
 
Subjecting State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Sri Lanka to the governance regulations of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can significantly enhance their governance in several ways: 
 
1. Enhanced Transparency:  
 
2. Improved Accountability:  
 
3. Enhanced Stakeholder Confidence: 
 
4.Professionalisation of the Board:  
 
5. Ethical Conduct and Compliance:
 
By adopting CSE and SEC governance regulations, Sri Lanka’s SOEs can significantly improve their operational efficiency, transparency, and accountability. This move can help build public trust, attract investment, and ensure that these enterprises contribute effectively to national economy. The SOE Reform Policy is Sri Lanka’s economic game-changer. By clearly delineating state roles, injecting commercial discipline, fortifying governance, and mandating transparency, it transforms SOEs from political fiefdoms to public assets.