The petitioner in that application, a lady named Vera Beth Stone, was supporting her own application

Miss Stone told the Bench, “It does not have to be tomatoes,” and threw a second book at the Bench

Lord Denning politely told her again: “Will you leave?”

This is the first case, so far as I know, where this court has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself.

Mr. Quintin Hogg has criticised the court, but in so doing he is exercising 
his undoubted right

It may  be said that it was what is popularly known as ‘British Justice’ that really delivered justice to a Member of Parliament of Ceylon. The British judges have displayed a very broad, liberal and cautious attitude in cases of Contempt of Court. Lord Atkin, a distinguished English Judge in the case of Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322 at 335) said: “But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.”

 On June 14,  1964, a Bench of the Court of Appeal  presided over by Lord Denning was hearing an application for leave to appeal a judgment in a lower court. The petitioner in that application, a lady named Vera Beth Stone, was supporting her own application.  The Court of Appeal Bench presided over by Lord Denning refused to grant leave to appeal. Angered by the order made by the Bench, she picked up a book in front of her and said:“This is not a personal matter, but I have to bring this before the court.”. She hurled the book at Lord Denning . The book flew past the ear of Lord Denning, and struck the paneling behind him. Neither he nor either of the two other judges on the dais, Lord Justices Harman and Diplock, showed agitation. Miss Stone told the Bench, “It does not have to be tomatoes,” and threw a second book at the Bench. “Will you please leave the court!” Lord Denning politely told Miss Stone :“Will you please leave the court!”. Miss Stone replied:“I shall only come back and throw more books”.

  Lord Denning politely told her again: “Will you leave?” Miss Stone  looked at the table to see whether she had more books to hurl at the Bench, and said “I am running out of ammunition.” Lord Dening told the Uher of the Court to take her away from the Court. As she was led from the courtroom, she said to Lord Denning: “May I congratulate Your Lordship upon your coolness under fire.” The Bench did not charge Miss Stone for Contempt of Court. The New York Times of June 16, 1964 published a news item on this incident under the headline “3 British Judges Keep Decorum As Woman Hurls Books at Them”. 

In 1968, Quintin Hogg QC MP, later to become Lord Hailsham,was prosecuted for ‘scandalising the Court of Appeal (a common law species of contempt of court) upon a private application brought against him by one Blackburn to the effect that an article in “ Punch “magazine dated Feb. 14, 1968, under the headline “Political Parley “ written by Hogg QC . amounts to Contempt of Court. In that article,Hogg QC wrote: “The recent judgment of the Court of Appeal is a strange example of the blindness which sometimes descends on the best of judges. The legislation of 1960 and thereafter has been rendered virtually unworkable by the unrealistic, contradictory and, in the leading case, erroneous, decisions of the courts, including the Court of Appeal. So what do they do? Apologise for the trouble they have put the police into? Not a bit of it.

Lambaste the police for not enforcing the law which they themselves had rendered unworkable and which is now the subject of a Bill, the manifest purpose of which is to alter it. Pronounce an impending Dies Irae on a series of parties not before them, whose crime it has been to take advantage of the weaknesses in the decisions of their own court. Criticise the lawyers, who have advised their clients. Blame Parliament for passing Acts which they have interpreted so strangely. Everyone, it seems, is out of step, except the courts. . . The House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal. . . it is to be hoped that the courts would remember the golden rule for judges in the matter of obiter dicta. Silence is always an option.” 

Lord Denning, delivering the judgment in this application said:  “That article is certainly critical of this court. In so far as it referred to the Court of Appeal, it is admittedly erroneous. This court did not in the gaming cases give any decision which was erroneous, nor one which was overruled by the House of Lords. Is the article, however, a contempt of court?

This is the first case, so far as I know, where this court has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us, but which we will most sparingly exercise: more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter. Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity.

That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy.

Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which. is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will ‘ deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done.

So it comes to this. Mr. Quintin Hogg has criticised the court, but in so doing he is exercising his undoubted right. The article contains an error, no doubt, but errors do not make it a contempt of court. We must uphold his right to the uttermost.

I hold this not to be a contempt of court, and would dismiss the application.”

[Re. vs  Metropolitan Police Commissioner ,Ex parte Blackburn, All England Law Reports[1968] 2 All E.R]
In Mauritius , one Hunam, a public figure in that country, in an interview with a French language newspaper, made several allegations of judicial misconduct and corruption against the Chief Justice of Mauritius. Dhooharika, editor of the paper, who interviewed Hunam, published the full interview with Hunam’s allegations against the Chief Justice. In his editorial, Dhooharika stated that the President of Mauritius should appoint a committee to investigate the allegations and that the CJ should appear before such Committee to defend himself. The editor and the company that owned the newspaper were sued for contempt of Court. The editor was sentenced to jail for three months. The Supreme Court of Mauritius refused to grant Dhooharika leave to appeal the  judgment to the Privy Council. The Privy Council granted Dhooharika special leave to appeal the judgment of the Supreme Court of  Mauritius. The Bench of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council comprising Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, and Lord Hodge held that the publication of the interview with the allegations of judicial misconduct and corruption against the Chief Justice of Mauritius in good faith and in public interest ,and editor’s persuasive suggestion for an investigation into the allegations by a Presidential Committee did not amount to the contempt of the Supreme Court of Mauritius. See Dhooharika (Appellant) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2014] UKPC 11,Privy Council Appeal No 0058 of 2012. It may be noted that the offence of ‘scandalising the judiciary’ (also referred to as scandalising the court or scandalising judges)has been abolished in England and Wales by section 33 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as ‘obsolescent’.