‘After Commo had Roosted’ -- Jan 27; 60 yrs Ago....

The acting Navy Chief, Rajan Kadirgamar was another key officer to be arrested and held incommunicado for a certain period of time. On the morning of D-day, the 27th,CC Dissanayake, DIG [CC], met a few of his gazetted officers at his office and entrusted them with different tasks. Two of his faithful men were assigned with the arrest of acting navy chief Kadirgamar; he spoke on the plan to take-over the government at midnight that day and said the code name assigned to navy commander was ‘Commo’. The task was to be executed after the Navy commander had retired to bed. The code for that, as explained by CC was ‘After Commo had roosted’. 

Temple Trees on 27th Night  

Kadirgamar, was seen in blue battle dress toting a sub-machine gun and pacing down the corridors of Temple Trees. A cordon had already been thrown around Temple Trees. It was tense all around; no one was certain whether the coup was still on or not. The four hours from 5.30 to 9.30 in the nightfall of January 27, 1962, exactly 60 years ago, will go into the records as history’s most critical hour that determined the nation’s destiny. Two contending parties, one who conspired and planned an overthrow of a democratically elected government in a Coup d’état, putting final touches to the blue print, while the other, the state authorities, sensing a calamity becoming busy designing and planning a defence. Both held separate crucial discussions; each party at three different locations in the City of Colombo.   

Driven by an overriding emotion of loss of power and the position, a few senior military and police officers conspired to take over the State from a democratically chosen government on the pretext of politicians were ruining the nation through maladministration. The Coup, code named, “Operation Holdfast” was expected to be conducted within a few hours. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who continued the socialist policies of her husband was thought as weak, inexperienced, and unfit to rule. She was to be arrested on 27th Saturday night.  

"Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike, couldn’t find a ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ among the DIGs-SSPs, and he bungled by bringing outsider, MWF Abeykoon CCS, bypassing a number of career police officers. Ex Military-Police officers in Civilian roles or vice versa, however, always had detrimental effects"

Seizure of Colombo was believed important to resist a likely counter-strike. As per design, around 10.00-11.00 pm.Col. FC de Saram [FC], deputy commandant of the Volunteer Force positioned at Temple Trees with CC at Queen’s House. CC was to issue a ‘Take post’ order. Ex-DIG Sydney de Zoysa will co-ordinate Army and Police procedures from Field Force HQs. Col. Maurice de Mel to takeover Army headquarters: ASP Johnpillai—clear strategically significant locations on all main roads. Telegraph Exchange, the CTO, was to be shut down; Times of Ceylon, Lake House, and the only electronic communication establishment, Radio Ceylon, will be seized before midnight.  

 The civilian IGP was caught off guard. He, in fact, continued his game of bridge at the Orient Club, even after being informed of imminent danger. Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike, couldn’t find a ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ among the DIGs-SSPs, and he bungled by bringing outsider, MWF Abeykoon CCS, bypassing a number of career police officers. Ex Military-Police officers in Civilian roles or vice versa, however, always had detrimental effects.   

 With the dawn of 1962, the country’s labor unrest worsened. There was a growing concern among the opposition and some government members as well, about the ‘Dias and Dias’ combine’s move toward taking control of the government machinery. Such a plan, if ever there was one, was backed by a solid exigency plan to either thwart a general strike or to meet a catastrophe by deploying the armed services. There had been heated debates in the house from early January. Opposition parties, Leftists and the UNP were accusing Felix Dias of conspiring with his defence secretary NQ Dias to establish a military dictatorship.  

On January 16, FC inspected the ammunition magazine at army headquarters. He also visited the Ceylon Army Ordinance Corps Headquarters, which was near Army Headquarters, on a non-working day and met Abeysinghe and asked to see the ammunition magazines of which there were three behind Army Headquarters. A few days later he came again on a working day and again he showed De Saram and Col. Alwis, who accompanied him, the magazines.  
On the 23rd, FC summoned Abeysinghe over the telephone, to his office. He was asked, in the presence of CC, to stay at Army Headquarters and execute some orders which were “originating right from the top.” Abeysinghe understood the reference was to the Governor-General, when he asked; “What about the Army Commander?” he was told that he would come into it later.   

"Driven by an overriding emotion of loss of power and the position, a few senior military and police officers conspired to take over the State from a democratically chosen government on the pretext of politicians were ruining the nation through maladministration. The Coup, code named, “Operation Holdfast” was expected to be conducted within a few hours"

 Senior Cabinet ministers, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, the young dynamic kinsman of Bandaranaikes and important government officials, including NQ Dias, were to be arrested and taken to Army headquarters. They were to be detained in an underground dungeon at the armoury. Air Force chief, John F Barker; Inspector General of Police, MWF Abeykoon and commander of the army, Major-General Gerard Wijeykoon were all to be placed under house arrest.  

 However, Capt. Edmond Weerasinghe [3rd Field Artillery Regiment], the 12th accused who was acquitted by Trial-at-Bar, and later married writer’s colleague at Shaw Wallace & Hedges, during ‘get-togethers’ with the office staff in the early 1970s, have said, all detainees albeit the PM, were to be summarily executed. [Under the authority of military law, summary execution is illegal in almost all situations, as ‘court marshal’ would be the judge needed to decide guilt and state the sentence of death.]  
When the arrest was made at the H-hour, Kadirgamar was to be taken to army headquarters and the password for admission to army headquarters that night was ‘Yatura’. CC met another senior police officer and entrusted him with the job of stationing himself at army headquarters for the purpose of identifying the detainees brought in by various groups.   

 As instructed by him, all the gazetted police officers in the Colombo division met at the office of Superintendent of Police, Colombo; at 6.00 pm. CC arrived at the venue at around 6.30 and dispatched selected officers in batches to their duty stations. The remaining ‘loyal’ group of officers joined by two gazetted officers from outside Range I were warned by him that the Criminal Investigations branch of Police had smelt something and that Sydney de Zoysa was being tracked down. They too were asked to dismiss, leaving only two named men behind. The DIG then instructed them to take adequate men with them and ‘camp’ near the residences of Army Commander Wijekoon and air vice Marshall Barker, Commander, Air Force, to prevent them from leaving their homes.  

Army commander, civilian IGP, Air Force chief, and Acting Navy commander were entirely in the dark. On triumphant accomplishment, the coup leaders would meet G-G and demand a deferment of the Constitution, and handover authority to them. They feared a leak. As a contingency Lt. Col. Willie Abraham was moved into Temple Trees. It was on 27th morning during their walks on Galle Face that CC revealed the scheme to his loyal subordinate, Stanley Senanayake SP Colombo, inviting him to join. them. Stanley remained non-committal, but met CC same afternoon at his residence.   

Son of CC, TDSA, writer, author, diplomat describes the conference his father had with Stanley in ‘Politics of Sri Lanka’–Vol. III …,   
“Sir, May I now reiterate what I told you at Galle Face this morning, when for the first time you asked me to join your coup. I am totally opposed to a democratically elected government being overthrown by a Coup d’e` tat, be it bloodless or otherwise, be it run by gentlemen or otherwise”  
Realizing that he had misapprehended Stanley, DIG kept pondering over. De Mel brothers, Sydney, FC, about the viability of going ahead as planned. Father-in-law of Colombo Mayoress Rosy, Stanley Senanayake, grappling with his principles for hours, finally told his wife Maya, daughter of P. de S. Kularatne, MP, about the conspiracy. She conveyed it to her father. Around 6.00 pm, Kularatne informed the IGP, who passed it on to Felix Dias for counter action.  

 Stanley revealed the names of senior police officers involved; also confirmed that a briefing by the leaders was on at that instant at Lt. Col. Jesudasan’s at Elibank road. Felix Dias ordered sealing off of Police Depot to prevent movement of arms, vehicles, ammunition and men. Telex room, where radio-teletype messages could be sent by the plotters to stations was shut down. Air Force Commander was to reinforce the security at Temple Trees. All three commanders assisted in countering the coup. The junior officers involved cooperated too; they thought by making confessions they would boost their chance of being excused. Making immediate arrests of key men in the conspiracy was imminent. It was decided to arrest CC, Sydney, Morris de Mel by mid night and the operation was carried out in a harsh manner. Strangely, FC, the Bandaranaike kinsman was asked to appear before PM on the following morning. They say ‘Blood is thicker than….’?  

Trial-at-Bar, presided by Justice MC Sansoni, with Justice HNG Fernando, and Justice LB De Silva sat for 324 days from June 3, 1963. Eleven defendants were convicted for ten years imprisonment, and forfeiture of properties.  
 Convicts appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, UK in April 1965. On December 2, 1965, The JC comprising Lords McDermott, Pearson, Morris, Guest and Pearce held: “The Ceylon Government has no powers to pass the new law styled, ‘The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act No. 1 of 1962, which is utlra vires, bad in law, and had denied a fair trial … the convictions cannot stand.”   

We seem to have had a narrow shave; if not for the speedy and intelligent investigations and prompt counter actions, “nipping it in the bud,” so to speak, Sri Lanka could have become another Pakistan, Thailand or Myanmar, with recurring military interventions.   
Excerpts from writer’s 74,670-word Manuscript on 1962 January Coup d’e `tat, titled, ‘Bloodshed ’62: Aborted or Abandoned?’- Which is to be launched in February, 2022.