By
D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The India – Sri Lanka Accord was signed by former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and ex-Sri Lanka president Junius Richard (JR) Jayewardene on July 29, 1987 in Colombo. The 35th anniversary of the pact known generally as the Indo-Lanka Accord will be observed this Friday (July 29).

 The Rajiv-JR accord was signed with the laudable objective of bringing peace to Sri Lanka by ending the war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and armed Tamil militant groups.  A ceasefire was declared and Indian army personnel with the nomenclature of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was stationed in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the Island to maintain peace.

 Sadly, instead of ushering in a durable peace, the Indo-Lanka accord paved the way for more violence and bloodshed. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by its supremo Veluppillai Prabhakaran refused to accept the accord and went back to war. Soon a full-fledged guerilla war was waged by the LTTE against the IPKF in the North and East. The national socialist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) led by Rohana Wijeweera also opposed the Indo-Lanka accord and engaged in armed resistance in the predominantly Sinhala areas.

JVP Campaign Against India
There is a widespread belief that the JVP campaign against India in 1987-1990 was twisted in the sense that the “Rathu Sahodarayo” killed people in the South as perceived collaborators of the Indian “invasion” and urged boycotts of Indian products including “Mysore Parippu” and “Bombay Onions” but never ever took on the Indian army directly. The JVP is often mocked for this as cowards who could only kill unarmed people in the South while not daring to lift a finger against the armed Indian soldiers in the North and East.

 While this accusation is correct to a very great extent, there was however a notable exception. This was in Trincomalee District where the JVP engaged in armed action against the Indian army and even drew blood in a few instances.

 The JVP’s anti-Indian military wing known as “Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya” (Patriotic People’s Movement) was commanded by “Keerthi Wijayabahu”. Its area leader for Trincomalee in 1989 was none other than Premakumar Gunaratnam the current leader and General Secretary of the “Peratugami Samajavadi Pakshaya” (Frontline Socialist Party). As is well known the FSP was formed by a breakaway faction from the JVP. Kumar Gunaratnam was then operating under the nom de guerre “Gemunu”. He was the man who led the JVP/DJV against the Indian army in the Trincomalee District.

 Under the leadership of Gunaratnam/Gemunu, the DJV-JVP accomplished a few military strikes against the Indian Army but these incidents did not gain much publicity due to the concerted efforts of the Sri Lankan and Indian authorities to deliberately suppress information. They did not want the JVP to gain publicity and political credit through these operations. Besides most incidents of that nature in Trincomalee were believed to have been committed by the Tigers then.

 Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Paris and Moscow Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka in an article written to the Sri Lankan media some years ago had this to say about the incident. 

“Kumara Gunaratnam’s older brother Ranjithan (said to be dead) was one of the most intelligent, able and disciplined cadres I have met anywhere. By comparison, Kumara himself seems to have had more guts than brains, but those guts were in abundance. While the JVP cadre was busily murdering Sinhala leftists and minor state employees in the name of a patriotic war against the IPKF, Kumara was a true believer who actually planned and possibly participated in an ambush of an IPKF unit. The morning after, the JVP leadership contacted the Indian Deputy High Commissioner and profusely apologised, promising never to repeat that.”

 In my article about FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam in these columns last week, I had concluded with the note that Kumar’s exploits with the Indian Army would be related in another related article. I would therefore like to focus now on the little-known role of “Gemunu” during the Indian army period. The objective is not to portray Gunaratnam alias ‘Gemunu’ as a hero but to relate the tale of an important phase in the JVP’s history that is not much known.
 Although the mass media of the day have not publicised this phase, there is some important material available in books, monographs and research papers. Chief among them are the books “Sri Lanka: A lost Revolution (The inside story of the JVP) and “Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka” by Prof. Rohan Gunaratna. I have also contacted knowledgeable journalists, authors, academics, research scholars, security officials and above all, some ex -JVP members in gathering information about Kumar Gunaratnam. Having written extensively about him in the past, I shall rely on much of those writings to relate the tale of the man who fought a guerilla war against the Indian army under the nom de guerre “Gemunu” three decades ago.

 Elder Brother Ranjithan Gunaratnam
 Kumar and elder brother Ranjithan Gunaratnam were in the vanguard of the JVP in the eighties of the 20th century.  They were among five children born to Aadhimoolampillai and Valliamma Rajamany Gunaratnam. The father was a Jaffna Tamil and the mother was an Up Country Tamil of Indian origin. The family lived in Anguruwella, Kegalle. 

 Both Ranjithan and Kumar studied in the Sinhala medium and entered the Peradeniya University Engineering Faculty in different years. Both got immersed in Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) politics and as a result, had to drop out of undergraduate studies at different times.

 Ranjithan later functioned as convenor of the JVP-backed Inter-University Student Federation. He was much liked and respected. Ranjithan became a member of the 21-member JVP Central Committee and later the seven-member politburo. He was a personal favourite of JVP supremo Rohana Wijeweera. Ranjithan was the District Secretary of the JVP for the Kurunegala District. On one occasion he was sent to the multi-ethnic Trincomalee District by the JVP hierarchy. He set up a Trincomalee District committee of the JVP that functioned even during the time when the Indian Army was occupying the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

 Ranjithan was captured by the Sri Lankan security forces in January 1990. He was tortured and interrogated while in custody. Later he was summarily executed by a paramilitary death squad aligned with the state. His body was disposed of. Ranjithan Gunaratnam is classified among the “missing” still. He was born in 1960 and was 30 years old at the time of his death.
 

Pallekele Army Camp
 Younger brother Kumar who joined the JVP against the wishes of his elder brother was appointed field commander of the JVP unit that seized the arsenal at the Pallekele army camp. This was on April 14, 1987. The JVP led by Kumar made off with a sizeable cache of firearms and ammunition using a route along the river. Kumar went underground and was arrested within six weeks on May 23, 1987, at Galagedara.  Kumar Gunaratnam was later taken to Colombo and detained at the Magazine Prison under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) as Detenue No D3301. He along with seven others (Chandrasiri, Samaranayake, De Costa, Jayantha, Lakshman, Sisira and Ranjith) were indicted at the Colombo High Court in 1988 (case No 3591/88) for the Pallekelle armed robbery.

 While in Magazine Prison he began conducting political classes for the JVP suspects in custody. He was transferred to the Bogambara Prison in Kandy. There in Bogambara, he and another JVP Central Committee member, “Ragama Somay” devised a plan to escape. This included the digging of a secret tunnel as in the case of the film classic “The Great Escape”. On December 13, 1988, they put the plan into action and broke out of Bogambara Jail.  Consequently, an open warrant was issued for the arrest of Kumar Gunaratnam.

“Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya”
 After escaping, Kumar established contact with the JVP hierarchy. It was while he was in custody that the Indo-Lanka Accord had been signed and the Indian Army deployed in the North and East. In the changed situation, Kumar was issued new directives by the JVP leadership. He was appointed secretary of the JVP District Committee in Trincomalee and elevated to the Central Committee. He was also assigned the nom de guerre “Gemunu” and instructed to conduct a military campaign against the Indian forces under the aegis of the “Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya”. Thus the younger brother took over the District Committee set up by the elder brother in Trinco.

 Trincomalee was the only district under Indian army control in which the JVP was functioning. It had about 15 to 20 cadres under the command of the committee. Kumar alias Gemunu was immediately made secretary of the committee and placed in overall charge. The committee comprised five persons, namely Gemunu, de Saram, Sanath, Arjuna and Pindeniya.

 One of the plus points for the JVP in Trincomalee was that it had acquired some arms in 1987 from the army camp in Kallar. The gradual takeover of the North and East by the Indian army was resented by some sections of the armed forces who began connecting with the JVP. When the garrison at Kallar was required to be downsized, some soldiers conspired with the JVP to “stage” an arms robbery.

The Rajiv-JR accord was signed with the laudable objective of bringing peace to Sri Lanka by ending the war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and armed Tamil militant groups

Kantale/Kanthalai Area
 A pre-planned “JVP raid” took place on October 25, 1987 where a number of weapons were reportedly taken away by the JVP. While some were returned unofficially to some soldiers the rest were retained by the JVP. Thus, when Gunaratnam alias Gemunu took up command in February 1989 the JVP had in its possession a small quantity of weapons and explosives. Gemunu based himself in the Kantale/Kanthalai area and began a rapid campaign of recruitment and indoctrination. He concentrated only on the Sinhala residents of the area.

 Meanwhile, the JVP had established links with the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) led by Uma Maheswaran. This link-up was greatly facilitated by the relationship between the JVP Secretary Upatissa Gamanayake and PLOTE military commander Manikkathasan. Both were sons of two sisters. The PLOTE however was not strong in Trincomalee and not in a position to help the JVP but Gemunu did interact with the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) that was well entrenched in Trincomalee. He avoided the pro-Indian TELO, EPRLF and ENDLF. Likewise, he shunned the LTTE which he regarded as fascist and pro-western.

 Gunaratnam alias Gemunu did not want to enter even into a tactical alliance with the Tigers. Ironically the LTTE soon aligned with the Premadasa regime in May 1989 which helped the state to hunt down the JVP easily.

According to information available Kumar Gunaratnam alias Gemunu recruited around 100 youths in two batches and conducted two week-long educational classes for them. Of these about 20 – 25 were specially selected and given a rapid weapons training course for three days. Being explicitly instructed by the JVP hierarchy to confront the Indian army directly, “Gemunu” of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya began aiming at the Indian army convoys and vehicles as targets. He was lucky because an army deserter codenamed “Sarath Kule” teamed up with the JVP. He had quit the army after the Indian air drop of June 4, 1987.

 Sarath Kule had some training in explosives and could set up landmines. Since Kumar too had an engineering background the two together were able to engage in explosive attacks. 

The JVP high command had already instructed Gemunu that attacks on the Indian army should be launched in July to denote the second anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord on July 29.

 
93rd Milepost Area Attack
 The JVP picked the 93rd milepost area on the Kandy-Trincomalee road near Kantale/Kanthalai as the ideal location for a landmine attack. Initially, a landmine was placed on the road but was detected by an Indian army mine–clearing foot patrol in the morning. The LTTE was suspected and not the JVP which was yet to make its mark. Kumar Gunaratnam alias Gemunu being a shrewd tactician made the unorthodox decision of placing landmines again in the evening in the same 93rd milepost vicinity. He calculated that the Indians would not expect a repetition on the same day in the same location.

So Sarath Kule and Gemunu set up two landmines in close proximity. A JVP cadre was placed at a vantage point and tasked with the duty of watching out for Indian army trucks and signal that vehicles were approaching. Unlike the LTTE, the JVP had no walkie-talkies. Unfortunately, the JVP cadre assigned this duty developed cold feet at the last minute and ran away. So the leader Gemunu had to replace him. He saw an Indian army truck approaching and signalled to Sarath Kule. Then he ran back furtively to the target area. Instead of a convoy only a truck and jeep arrived. When the landmines were set off only one exploded and hit the truck. The jeep braked and then reversed rapidly.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by its supremo Veluppillai Prabhakaran refused to accept the accord and went back to war

 In the meantime, an Indian army post had been set up on the other side of the milepost after the detection of the landmine in the morning. That was not known to the JVP which had not conducted any reconnaissance or “recce”. Indian soldiers began running towards the scene of the explosion firing their weapons. The soldiers in the truck also started firing wildly and running. In the melee, the JVP cadres led by Gemunu managed to retrieve an LMG and SMG and escape into the jungle without injury.

 It was after this attack that the Indian security forces realised that the JVP too was now confronting them directly. Some sections of the Sri Lankan security forces were excited by this development. Several security personnel began contacting the JVP, encouraging them to launch attacks against the Indian army and pledging clandestine cooperation. Accordingly, Gemunu and Sarath Kule took the bold step of entering Trincomalee town and placing a landmine in the dockyard area. They were aided and abetted by Naval personnel. An Indian army truck was targeted but the landmine went off prematurely near the jetty. Both men escaped from the area with the help of sailors.
 

Ambush in Mullippothanai
 With July 29 fast approaching the JVP under Gemunu wanted to make a decisive impact through a major attack. The opportunity came on July 25, 1989. On that day the JVP launched an ambush in Mullippothanai, a Tamil village to the west of Thambalakamam/Thambalagamuwa. An Indian army truck was hit by a JVP landmine. The JVP cadres then surrounded the vehicle and started firing. 

 Fourteen Indian Jawans were killed and three injured. 
The JVP made off with the seized firearms. It was a big success for the JVP and sent alarm bells ringing in the corridors of power.
 

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
 What commander Gemunu of the JVP did not know then was those sections of the JVP through initiatives of the Indian espionage agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had set up a back channel of communication with Indian officials. The Deputy High Commissioner at the time, Nirupam Sen had encouraged such a liaison with the JVP and other southern leftist entities. Sen was to be High Commissioner in Colombo years later.   The Indian High Commissioner Jyotindra Nath Dixit dubbed those days as the viceroy of Sri Lanka, had himself re-organised the Colombo mission’s structure after the Indo–Lanka Accord. Two political secretaries had been appointed with Dr. S. Jaishankar, a Tamil Brahmin looking after the North and East and Gurjeet Singh, a Sikh overseeing the other seven provinces. First Secretary Joseph Thariyal, a Keralite Christian was the RAW point man at the Indian High Commission. Incidentally, Dr. Jaishankar is now the Indian Foreign Minister.

Sadly, instead of ushering in a durable peace, the Indo-Lanka accord paved the way for more violence and bloodshed

 The line of communication to some JVP elements was allegedly maintained by the trio of Nirupam Sen, Gurjeet Singh and Joseph Thariyal. When the JVP under Kumar Gunaratnam struck forcefully on July 25, the Indian officials were shocked and angry. The JVP elements in contact with the Indians had to tender an apology for the incident to Nirupam Sen and promise that it would not happen again. An urgent message was sent to Gemunu to suspend attacks against the Indian army. A lull set in thereafter in JVP operations against the Indian Army.   Gemunu was thoroughly disappointed at this turn of events but continued to strengthen the JVP in Trincomalee. He intensified recruitment and also began garnering more arms. He also embarked on a mission of interacting with and wooing disgruntled members of the security forces.

 Arrest at Monkey Bridge
 It was on such a mission that he set forth on September 24, 1989. A meeting had been arranged with a soldier who had promised to give him a few firearms. But when Gemunu reached Palampottaru or Monkey Bridge he was arrested. He had walked into a trap which apparently had been devised by former Army Commander and current MP Field Marshall Sarath Fonseka, who was the commanding officer of the area at the time.

 Though in army custody, Kumar was treated kindly. Many army officers liked him and were sympathetic. Instead of placing him in a cell, the army kept him in the officers’ quarters in Kantale. He acted as a batman to a senior officer. Kumar also advised the army officers on how to handle and treat arrested JVP suspects. He even liaised with them. After the Indian army left in 1990 March, war broke out with the LTTE in June 1990. Kumar Gunaratnam was transferred to Pallekele, the place where he began his armed militancy. He was housed at the rehabilitation centre in Pallekele. What happened thereafter has been recounted in detail in the article last week. 
 D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at [email protected]