The South China sea risks a military crisis

Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. drew a red line during his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Friday, saying that the death of any Philippine citizen in the country’s ongoing standoff with Beijing in the South China Sea would be “very, very close to … an act of war.” In such an event, “we would have crossed the Rubicon,” he said, responding to an audience question about U.S.-Philippine mutual defense.

A senior U.S. military official issued a similar warning in March. These comments underscore how if current trends continue, the slow boil in the disputed South China Sea is heading toward a military crisis. Washington’s actions, aimed at strengthening deterrence in the region, are failing to shift Beijing’s calculus. And Manila, while exercising agency to support its lawful maritime claim, is nevertheless being emboldened in ways that lack a clear strategy and enhance risks.

Anticipating a serious military crisis in the South China Sea is not alarmist. Incidents involving Chinese coercive actions—collisions, the use of water cannons and military-grade lasers, and swarming—are being reported with greater frequency and have even injured Philippine naval personnel. China has also become more assertive in law: A recent order provides for the detention of anyone suspected of trespassing within Beijing’s claim line in the South China Sea, which could be the prelude to a dangerous incident in the coming months.

Manila also shows no signs of pulling back its forays to the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, two key flash points in the South China Sea. The United States has sent a message by firmly backing the Philippines and doubling down on its “ironclad commitment” to its ally. When it comes to confronting Beijing, it seems that Manila is pushing on Washington’s open door. The cascading entry of other U.S. allies such as Australia, France, and Japan into the theater is another concerning development.

The public stances of the Philippines, China, and the United States in the South China Sea are well established. As Marcos asserted at Shangri-La, the Philippines refers to its sovereign rights and international law, citing the 2016 judgment by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague that ruled overwhelmingly in its favor. China talks of sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. The United States cites Chinese coercion and threats to freedom of navigation.

Dig deeper, though, and there are other factors at play—many of which are pushing the region toward escalation.

For the United States, it increasingly seems that it is not just China’s intrusive behavior in the region that poses a challenge—as it should—but also Beijing’s rise. Washington may only articulate it in rare moments, but its assertiveness in the South China Sea cannot be entirely separated from anxieties about its relative decline. In the last decade or so, the United States has lost primacy in Asia, certainly in the economic sphere and arguably in the military domain. But it has a hard time letting go of the habits of primacy, such as a tendency to see any gains for China as losses for the United States and vice versa.

China’s continued harassment of Philippine craft has bolstered Manila’s tougher stance. But the country’s foreign policy is historically driven by personality, and having Marcos in power has been critical. Quite early in his term, Marcos made a clean break with former President Rodrigo Duterte and tilted toward the United States. There is a consensus within the Philippines on its maritime claim in what it calls the West Philippine Sea; the PCA ruling legitimized this claim under international law.

China, which never recognized the PCA proceedings and rejected the 2016 ruling, calls the South China Sea a historical claim and therefore argues that it is legitimate. The claim indeed predates Chinese Communist Party rule—that’s why Taiwan also has the same claim. Beijing reinforced the claim through an island-building and militarization push in 2014, soon after Chinese President Xi Jinping took power and began espousing his own brand of Chinese nationalism. A  2012 military standoff with the Philippines and Manila’s internationalization of the dispute by turning to the PCA in January 2013 also helped drive Chinese maritime assertions.

China may wish to emerge as Asia’s hegemon, but it remains far from achieving any such goal. Most immediately, China is concerned with the implications of the U.S.-Philippine alliance for a Taiwan conflict; it suspects that new U.S. military sites in the Philippines are designed to be used in such a conflict. In general, Beijing often portrays Manila as a pawn in what it sees as Washington’s China containment strategy, leading it to treat Philippine concerns over Chinese claims dismissively.

The U.S. presence in the Philippines is growing. Last year, the five U.S. military sites originally defined under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement increased to nine. Three of the new sites are in northern Luzon, near Taiwan, and one is in a naval base—the first of its kind under the agreement. The United States is also assisting in port construction in the Batanes islands north of Luzon, even closer to Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Philippines has begun joint military patrols with the United States and Australia and signed off on a trilateral pact with the United States and Japan with a military dimension.