China Suffers Set Back in Myanmar Peace Effort

Yet another attempt by China to mediate between the Myanmar ethnic rebel groups and the Yangon-based military rulers failed last Saturday. The talks failed to yield results because conflicting interests over-rode the desire for peace.
In Myanmar, political and ethnic divisions are also exacerbated by foreign meddling. 
This is why attempts to bring about lasting ceasefires and the resumption of talks to find solutions to the country’s underlying problems have invariably floundered. 
The Myanmar military known as “Tatmadaw” has got used to ruling the country directly or indirectly from the 1960s onwards. It is intolerant of elected governments and pro-democracy movements. The majority community, the Buddhist Bamar, seeks democracy, but only for itself, not for the many ethnically different Christian and Muslim groups in the North and in areas bordering China and Bangladesh.   

China has a deep interest in peace in Myanmar as it eyes the resource rich areas on its border with Myanmar. It also has infrastructure projects there, with plans for more. 
While striving for the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of talks, China does not want to alienate the Tatmadaw because the military is the most powerful and stable institution in Myanmar, an institution that has also been traditionally pro-Chinese. China is alienated from the pro-democracy movement because that movement draws inspiration and moral support from the West, with which China has a running feud. 
To keep up its relevance in Myanmar and to prevent any one group from becoming too powerful, China arms both the junta in Yangon and selected ethnic groups to keep them under its thumb.

As for the ethnic groups, they are alienated from both the military and the majority Bamar (including the pro-democracy agitators). This is because both the military and the Bamar want to crush them or deny them political autonomy and cultural and religious equality. The Bamar want to lord over all of Myanmar as the former British rulers did. 
China has “facilitated” (not mediated) talks between the rebels and the army. Last Wednesday, they facilitated talks between the “Brotherhood Alliance” and the military in Kunming. On Thursday, the warring parties agreed to an immediate ceasefire, followed by talks on resolving political issues. But on Friday, the military broke the agreement with air strikes on rebel positions. Yet another attempt by China to make the two sides negotiate, failed. 
The “Brotherhood Alliance” (BA) comprises the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA). BA is the biggest and most closely coordinated anti-government armed group comprising ethnic groups living in areas near the Myanmar-China border.
In support of the Brotherhood Alliance, dozens of resistance groups including the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) under the command of the now defunct National Unity Government (NUG) and other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) stepped up attacks on government targets in the North and East.
The Arakan Army widened operations in the Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh. The military faced resistance in the Mon and Karen states and the Yangon and Tanintharyi regions as well.

West Doubts China’s Intentions 

While China swears that it is non-partisan, western scholars like Morgan Michaels of the International Institute for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University feel that Beijing’s secret interest is in propping up the anti-Western junta and preventing the pro-West democracy movement from coming to power. 
Michaels says, China’s hidden agenda is to help the military junta withstand challenges from armed ethnic minorities as well as pro-democracy agitators.
Writing in the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Michaels points out that the border areas are critical for China, because they are rich in minerals. China has infrastructural projects here under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and it desires peace in this area mainly to serve its economic interests. According to Michaels, Beijing’s objective is to slow down the resistance movement so that the junta survives longer. The junta is favoured because it has been consistently pro-China and anti-West, and has been dependent on China and Russia for arms. 

In December 2022, China’s new special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun, met seven of Myanmar’s most powerful EAOs and told them that China would more actively enforce its policy against instability along the border, and that the EAOs should distance themselves from the National Unity Government (NUG), an opposition body established by lawmakers ousted by the coup. The NUG, China said, had become too close to the West. 
Since then, Chinese diplomats have been active setting up face to face talks between the military and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) of the EAOs. The latter has been told to avoid the NUG and its armed subsidiary the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). 
Michaels says that this will only help the junta achieve its key strategic objectives, which are to demilitarize the EAOs and the NUD and in turn help strengthen the junta and foster Beijing’s ties with it.
The Bamar, who are leading the democracy movement in Manmar, are seeking the support of the ethnic groups for their struggle, telling the EAOs that solutions to their problems lie in the restoration of democracy that was crushed by the 2021 military coup.
If the EAOs and the PDF form a close alliance, the junta will be in a soup. It is already feeling the heat. Following the coup, some brigades from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU) launched direct offensives on the military. They also gave the PDFs military training and arms, and even accompanied them in ambushes and attacks. 
But as Michaels says, the Chinese do not want an EAO-PDF alliance to blossom, as it will weaken the junta. 
The junta has adopted a carrot and stick policy of offering pauses in military operations and talks to amenable EAOs on the one hand, and launching vicious attacks on the recalcitrant ones. The junta may offer talks to the recalcitrant ones too, under Chinese pressure, but it will break the ceasefire at the first opportunity as it did last week.
The Chinese have also been adopting a carrot and stick policy vis-à-vis the junta. They are fostering an ethnic group called Wu on the border with Myanmar.
In 2017, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), a coalition of seven ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) was formed to seek negotiations with the central government. FPNCC is led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a group that maintains close ties with the Chinese Communist Party. The UWSA controls a de facto “statelet” divided into two non-contiguous territories along the Chinese and Thai borders. 

According to Michaels, Wa leaders command an estimated 25,000 troops equipped with weapons originating from China, including FN-6 Man-Portable Air Defence Systems, armoured vehicles and various light weapons. The UWSA also assembles a version of the Chinese Type-81 automatic rifle at a factory in its area of control. 
While China has historically limited the Wa from transferring more capable weapons to other actors in Myanmar, the UWSA has become the principal source of small arms and light weapons for its FPNCC allies.
The UWSA is also close with the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). Both the UWSA and NDAA are direct offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), a former armed group which split up in 1989.

Given their close relations with China and longstanding agreements with the military, the UWSA, NDAA and SSPP are all unlikely to seek a renewal of direct confrontation with the junta, Michaels says. They act as China’s proxies influencing the other EAOs to change their line as per China’s interests, one of which is to keep the junta firmly in the saddle in Yangon.